













July2003LIQUIDITY MOTIVES OF HOLDING MONEY
UNDER INVESTMENT RISK: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS∗
Kiyohiko G. Nishimura
Faculty of Economics






Jones and Ostroy (1984) argue that money, as an asset of the least transaction cost, oﬀers
ﬂexibility to its holder, which other assets cannot provide. We extend the idea of Jones and
Ostroy into a truely dynamic framework of inﬁnite horizon with a risk-neutral decision-maker.
We then investigate the eﬀect of an increase in investment risk on the demand for liquidity
` a la Jones and Ostroy. In particular, we prove that the opitmal strategy exists, that it has a
reservation property, and that the reservation value increases when investment risk increases
in the sense of a mean-preserving spread. While the eﬀect of a mean-preserving spread on
the reservation value is unambiguous, its eﬀect on money demand is ambiguous. We then
provide conditions on increasing investment risk under which money demand unambiguously
increases.
∗The work reported here is partially supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Institute,
the Cabinet Oﬃce, the Government of Japan.1
1. Introduction
Without doubt, money is the most liquid asset. To convert money to other assets is
immediate and costless, whereas to convert non-money assets to other assets including money
involves time and substantial transaction costs. Thus, money enables prompt moves among
various investment, both ﬁnancial and real. In a sense, money oﬀers liquidity services. It is
natural to assume that these liquidity services are one of the most important determinants of
money demand. In fact, this is the heart of the speculative demand for money, as opposed to
transaction and precautionary demand for money. Unfortunately, however, there are relatively
few examinations of the liquidity or speculative motive of holding money, as compared with the
transaction and precautionary motives.
Among existing literature of the liquidity motive of holding money, Jones and Ostroy
(1984)’s formulation has attracted much attention. They argue that money, as an asset of the
least transaction cost, oﬀers ﬂexibility to its holder, which other assets cannot provide. Under
the presence of liquidation (transaction) costs on other assets, money is held to enable the option
of waiting for tomorrow to resolve uncertainty rather than investing today under uncertainty.
Thus, their formulation of liquidity services of money can be considered as an enabler of options.
Their argument suggests that if the degree of uncertainty about the future increases and
the resolution of uncertainty is still gradual, the value of waiting increases and hence the demand
for liquidity also increases in the spirit of Jones and Ostroy’s “liquidity as ﬂexibility,” or money
as an enabler of options. In the current paper, we extend the idea of Jones and Ostroy into
a truly dynamic framework of inﬁnite horizon with a risk-neutral decision-maker and we then
investigate the eﬀect of an increase in investment risk on the demand for money.
To achieve this objective, we start from Taub’s (1988) model of pure-currency economy
where money is required to purchase commodities (which itself speciﬁes Lucas’ (1980) model
by assuming that a decision-maker is risk-neutral) and extend it into Markovian economic en-
vironment. Instead of assuming that money is required to buy commodities, we assume that
money is required to make investment. This assumption of a liquidity constraint in investment,
which might be called a cash-in-advance constraint in investment, is rationalized when there are
sizable transaction costs and transaction delays in trading with other assets than money, and it2
substantiates Jones and Ostroy’s idea of “liquidity as ﬂexibility” in our framework.
Speciﬁcally, we consider a behavior of a risk-neutral fund-manager who contemplates
in each period whether or not to make an irreversible investment which, if made, generates a
stochastic future return. We impose the liquidity constraint by assuming that the amount of
investment at one time is constrained by the fund-manager’s cash-holdings at that time. In fact,
this framework of dynamic setting can be reinterpreted as a variant of a real-option model, with
one additional assumption that money is required to make investment, either ﬁnancial or real.
We formally prove that the optimal strategy for the fund-manager exists and that it
takes the form of a “trigger” strategy. It is called a trigger strategy because there exists a
function of the return realized in the current period and the fund-manager puts all his available
money into investment if and only if the return exceeds the value of this function. In general,
the trigger is a function of the return. We show that when the stochastic kernel which describes
the Markov process satisﬁes some regularity conditions, the trigger is constant. In such a case,
we say that the optimal strategy has a reservation property and the fund-manager makes an
investment if and only if the return exceeds the constant reservation value.
We then investigate eﬀects of an increase in investment risk on the optimal strategy
and the resulting demand for money. Suppose that the stochastic kernel satisﬁes the conditions
which induce the reservation property of the optimal strategy and that the degree of uncertainty
increases in the sense of a mean-preserving spread. Then, the results of this paper show that a
new trigger level is always above the initial reservation value. Therefore, if making investment
is not an optimal strategy before the risk increases, it cannot be so after the risk has increased.
This result is totally consistent with a fact which is well-known in the theory of options: An
increase in risk or volatility increases the value of a waiting option. Since money as liquidity is
an enabler of this option, the value of money as liquidity increases when the risk increases.
Despite this fact, the demand for liquidity, which we deﬁne as a long-run time-average
cash-holdings of the fund-manager, may or may not increase as a result of a mean-preserving
spread. This ambiguity follows because while the trigger level increases by a mean-preserving
spread, the probability that the return exceeds the trigger level might also increase at the
same time. If the latter increase dominates the former one, the fund-manager becomes more3
likely to invest, and as a result, the demand for liquidity deﬁned as an average cash-holdings
decreases. This result suggests that the mean-preserving spread as a concept of an increase
in risk is not strong enough for us to derive the unambiguous eﬀect on money demand of an
increase in investment risk. We then present conditions under which an increase in investment
unambiguously increases the demand for money: When the return is distributed independently
and identically, an increase in investment risk characterized by a single-crossing property as well
as one additional regularity condition implies that the money demand increases unambiguously.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the model
and then illustrates some of the results of this paper. In particular, we specify the distribution
of the state variable as the uniform distribution to construct an example in which both the
reservation value and the average cash-holdings increase by a mean-preserving spread in risk. In
Section 3, we formally develop a model of an investment-fund manager with uncertain investment
opportunities in the future. Money, or cash in our formulation, is assumed to be needed to make
investment in a form of liquidity constraint, which captures ﬂexibility that liquidity provides.
We show that the optimal strategy for the fund-manager exists, that it can be characterized
by a trigger strategy and that it has a reservation property when the Markov process satisﬁes
some additional assumptions. We also deﬁne there the demand for liquidity as a long-run time-
average cash-holdings of the fund-manager. Section 4 conducts a sensitivity analysis in which
an increase in risk is examined in the framework described in Section 3. In particular, we show
that an increase in risk in the sense of a mean-preserving spread increases the trigger level. In
the same time, it turns out that the mean-preserving spread does not always imply that the
money demand also increases. We provide the conditions under which an increase in money
demand unambiguously follows. All proofs as well as some lemmas are given in Section 5.
We heavily draw on techniques of dynamic programming in order to prove the claims
made in the current paper. For such techniques, an approach based upon the contraction-
mapping theorem is common in the literature. However, we need to allow the possibility that
the money is accumulated without bound, and hence, a simple adaptation of the contraction-
mapping approach does not work here because it requires that the value function should be
bounded, which is not the case in our model. We, therefore, invoke the dynamic programming4
technique developed by Ozaki and Streufert (1996) for a wide class of objective functions which
includes unbounded ones. We adapt it for the framework of this paper and provide a series of
results along the line developed there. We do this in the Appendix. The proofs given in Section
5 rely on these results.
2. An Illustrative Example
This section gives a brief overview of the model and then illustrates some of the results
of this paper by specifying the distribution which governs state-variable’s evolution. The formal
analysis of the model starts in the next section.
2.1. Optimal Investment and Average Cash-holdings
Consider a manager of an investment fund, such as venture capital invested in venture
businesses, specialized in investing projects involving substantial ﬁxed costs that are sunk after
investment. This fund has a constant (positive) cash inﬂow of y in each period. Competition is
intense to ﬁnd good investment opportunities among such funds and the manager must be agile
in capturing these opportunities. This means that, at the time the manager has a promising
opportunity, he must have suﬃcient liquid assets ready to invest, rather than illiquid but higher-
return ones. In other word, the amount of investment at one time in those opportunities is
constrained by the fund’s holdings of liquid assets at that time. Since cash is the most liquid
asset, we hereafter consider cash as liquid assets, and to make analysis simple, we abstract away
from other less liquid ﬁnancial assets. We assume for simplicity that the general price level is
constant over periods, so that there is neither inﬂation nor deﬂation.
Under these assumptions, the fund-manager has a choice between investing in particular
opportunities in this period or wait until the next period setting cash inﬂow aside. Let mt be
the (non-negative) amount of cash that the fund-manager has in the beginning of period t and
let xt be the (non-negative) amount of investment which is made in period t and sunk afterward.
Then, the fund-manager’s budget constraint is given by
(∀t ≥ 0) xt + mt+1 ≤ y + mt5
and his liquidity constraint in investment is given by
(∀t ≥ 0) xt ≤ mt . (1)
The latter condition may also be considered as a cash-in-advance constraint in investment.
Let r be a net rate of interest and suppose that a unit investment opportunity in period
t yields the same net return ˆ zt in each period in indeﬁnite future starting at period t. Then,
the current value of all the future net returns on a unit investment made in period t is given by
zt ≡ (1+r)ˆ zt/r. We assume that investment is uncertain, in the sense that zt is stochastic. For
simplicity, we assume that zt is distributed according to a distribution function F0 independently
and identically in each period. (We relax this assumption later.) The fund-manager maximizes








evaluated with a constant discount factor β ∈ (0,1), by appropriately choosing an investment
strategy xt, taking account of both the budget constraint and the liquidity constraint. In the
above formula, E[·] denotes the expectation with respect to the inﬁnite-dimensional product
probability measure constructed from F0. (The exact form of the objective function will be
presented below by (16)).1
We will show in Section 3 that the optimal investment x∗
t has a reservation property and
can be characterized by
(∀t ≥ 0) x∗
t =
 
0i f zt ≤ R
mt if zt >R,
(3)






(1 − F0(z ))dz  (4)
(see Theorem 3 and the equation (25) below). The optimal investment strategy, (3), dictates the
investment of all available cash when the current shock (return) is greater than the reservation
1This model is also applicable for a ﬁnancial fund with cash (perfectly liquid assets) and consols (less liquid
assets), so long as transaction of the less illiquid assets involves substantial ﬁxed costs. There is no transaction cost
converting cash into the illiquid assets, while conversion of these assets into cash involves considerable transaction
costs. So long as these transaction costs are large, a portfolio manager does not sell the illiquid assets, and the
model is essentially the same as that in this section. See, for example, Leland (1999) for a recent treatment of
transaction costs in ﬁnancial markets.6
level, R, and no investment at all if otherwise. Furthermore, the money demand, m∗
0, deﬁned







This result has a natural interpretation. Consider one unit of cash in the fund-manager’s
hand at period t. Recall that if he invests this cash in the current investment opportunity, this
decision yields ˆ zt from this period onward. If he postpones his decision, he foregoes ˆ zt this
period, but he may get better opportunity yielding net return z ≥ ˆ zt in the future. Suppose
that the fund-manager has only one unit of cash to invest and he has to determine the optimal
timing of investment. This is a special case of classical optimal stopping problems about when
to exercise an option (to invest a unit of cash, in this case). The optimal strategy for this
problem is well-known to be (under some assumptions) a reservation strategy such that: “stop







(1 − ˆ F(z ))dz  (6)
and ˆ zt is assumed to be independently and identically distributed according to the distribu-
tion function, ˆ F (see, for example, Lippman and McCall, 1976; Sargent, 1987). Notice (6)’s
resemblance to (4).2
In the optimal stopping problem of the previous paragraph, the fund-manager has an
option to invest only one unit of cash (that is, he has only two alternatives: to invest or not)
and he makes a once-and-for-all decision about when to exercise this option. In the model of
this paper, the fund-manager is allowed to invest any amount of money as long as the liquidity
constraint is met and he decides whether or not to invest not only once but also in every period.
Despite these diﬀerences, the similarity between (4) and (6) indicates that the two models have









which is identical to (4).7
basically the very similar structure. This observation supports our view that cash is endowed
with a function of an “enabler” of the call option by the liquidity services it oﬀers.3
We now turn back to the equation (4). To make our analysis as simple as possible,
we further specify F0 to be a uniform distribution over [a,b], where 0 <a<b . The uniform-
distribution assumption greatly reduces complexity and allows us to obtain an explicit solution















2(1 − β)(b − a)
. (8)





b − (1 − β)a − D1/2
 
(9)
where D ≡ (1 − β)(b − a)[b − a + β(a + b)] .
It can be veriﬁed that R ∈ (a,b) certainly holds under the assumption (7), which justiﬁes (8).
2.2. An Increase in Risk
We now consider eﬀects on the reservation level and average cash-holdings caused by an
increase in risk. To be more speciﬁc, suppose that the uniform distribution F0 is slightly more
dispersed by γ, over [a − γ,b + γ]. This is a mean-preserving spread, a way of characterizing
increased risk (see Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970).
If this mean-preserving spread takes place, (8) is modiﬁed to
R =
β(b + γ − R)2
2(1 − β)(b − a +2 γ)
. (10)
3The liquidity constraint in investment, (1), certainly makes it easier for us to interpret money as a provider
of liquidity services. It is not, however, indispensable in order to derive the reservation property of the optimal
investment strategy (see Subsection 3.2.3). It is the assumption that investment is irreversible that is essential
to derive it. The existence of money makes it possible to postpone such irreversible investment and this is the
liquidity service money provides.8




   
   
γ=0
=
β(b − R)(R − a)
(b − a)[(1 − β)(b − a)+β(b − R)]
, (11)






   
γ=0
> 0.
This result shows that increased risk in the form of a mean-preserving spread increases the
reservation level.
In Section 4, we formally show that basically the same result holds not only locally (that
is, at γ = 0) but also globally (that is, R(γ) >R (0) for any positive γ), and not only for the
uniform distribution but also for general distributions. Furthermore, it is shown that the result
can be extended to a Markovian setting under appropriate assumptions.
We now turn to the eﬀect of a mean-preserving spread on the average cash-holdings.
Some algebra shows that
dF0(R(γ))
dγ








R(γ) − a + γ
b − a +2 γ





R (0)(b − a)+a + b − 2R
(b − a)2
=
(1 − β)(a + b)
(1 − β)(b − a)2 + β(b − a)(b − R)
where R(γ) is the solution to (10), R (0) is given by (11) and R is given by (9). Since R<bby
(7), we conclude that
dF0(R(γ))
dγ





This and (5) together show that increased risk in the form of a mean-preserving spread increases
the money demand deﬁned as the average cash-holdings.
It might seem that this result holds regardless of a speciﬁcation of the distribution
function in the light of the fact that a mean-preserving spread always increases the reservation9
level. However, we provide an example (Example 1) in Section 4, which exhibits a decrease
in money demand when a mean-preserving spread takes place. Thus, the eﬀect of a mean-
preserving spread on money demand is ambiguous in general. In the same section, we consider
another concept of being riskier which is stronger than the mean-preserving spread and show
that the money demand increases whenever a risk increases according to this concept under an
appropriate condition (see Proposition 2 below).
3. The Formal Model
3.1. Stochastic Kernel
The stochastic environment of the model is governed by a stochastic kernel, which we
discuss in this subsection. Let Z be a subset of R+ and let BZ be the Borel σ-algebra on Z.
We assume that Z is compact and convex, and hence, we may write as Z =[ z, ¯ z] where z and
¯ z are deﬁned by z = minZ and ¯ z = maxZ, respectively. We assume that z < ¯ z. The net
rate of returns on investment made in period t, zt, is a random variable on (Z,BZ). In our
model, zt also serves as a state variable. We assume that zt is distributed according to a Markov
process and we let P0(·|·):BZ × Z → [0,1] be a stochastic kernel which governs the transition
of zt. That is, P0 is such that (∀z) P0(·|z) is a probability measure on BZ and (∀E) P0(E|·)i sa
BZ-measurable function. We denote by F0 the (cumulative) distribution function derived from
P0, that is, (∀z ,z) F0(z |z)=P0([z,z ]|z ).
Throughout the paper, we assume that P0 is weakly continuous in the sense that for
any sequence  zn ∞
n=1 in Z which converges to z0, P0(·|zn) converges to P0(·|z0) in the weak
topology.4
Subsection 3.2.1 and Section 4 assume that P0 is stochastically increasing and stochas-
tically convex (Topkis, 1998). A stochastic kernel P0 is stochastically increasing if for each













The weak continuity of P0 is sometimes referred to as the Feller property (see, for example, Stokey and Lucas,
1989).10




h(z )P0(dz |z) (12)
is nondecreasing. A stochastic kernel P0 is stochastically convex if for each nondecreasing func-
tion h : Z → R, the mapping deﬁned on Z by (12) is convex.
Section 3.3 assumes that P0 has a limiting probability measure. A stochastic kernel P0
has a limiting probability measure if there exists a probability measure π0 on (Z,BZ) such that











converges to π0 in the weak topology as t goes to +∞. Such a π0 is called a limiting probability
measure of P0 and is unique when it exists. Furthermore, under the maintained assumption
that P0 is weakly continuous, π0 satisﬁes5




We may think of π0, when it exists, as describing the long-run behavior of P0.
We say that zt is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.)i fP0(·|z) is independent
of z. In the i.i.d. case, it is clear that the properties of P0 introduced so far are all satisﬁed.
The next proposition provides another example of a stochastic kernel which satisﬁes all of them.
Proposition 1. Let Z =[ 0 ,1] and let P0 be a stochastic kernel deﬁned by
(∀z,z  ∈ Z) F0(z |z)=P0([0,z ]|z )=
  z 
0
(2 − z)dz .
That is, P0(·|z) is the uniform distribution on [0,1/(2 − z)]. Then, P0 is weakly continuous,
stochastically increasing, stochastically convex and has a limiting probability measure.
3.2. Dynamic Programming Problem and Optimal Investment Strategy
Construct the t-fold self-product measurable space from (Z,BZ) and denote it by (Zt,BZt),
that is, (Zt,BZt)=( Z×···×Z,BZ ⊗···⊗B Z), where the products are t-fold. A generic element
5An argument similar to that of Stokey and Lucas (1989, p.376, Theorem 12.10) may be applied to prove this.11
of (Zt,BZt), which is denoted by (z1,...,z t)o r1zt, is a history of states’ realized up to period t.
An investment strategy is any R+-valued,  BZt -adapted stochastic process and denoted by 0x or
 xt ∞
t=0. Here, the  BZt -adaptedness requires that x0 ∈ R+ and (∀t ≥ 1) xt : Zt → R+ should be
BZt-measurable. Similarly, a money-holding strategy, denoted 1m or  mt ∞
t=1,i sa n yR+-valued,
 BZt−1 -adapted stochastic process. That is, m1 ∈ R+ and (∀t ≥ 2) mt is BZt−1-measurable.
Given m0 ≥ 0, an investment strategy 0x is feasible from m0 if there exists a money-holding
strategy 1m such that the budget constraint:
(∀t ≥ 0) xt + mt+1 ≤ y + mt , (14)
and the liquidity constraint in investment (or, the cash-in-advance constraint in investment):
(∀t ≥ 0) xt ≤ mt (15)
are both met.
Let β =1 /(1 + r), where r is the net rate of interest. The fund-manager maximizes the

















when the initial state is z0 and the investment strategy 0x is chosen.6 Since each component
of the sequence is well-deﬁned and the sequence is non-decreasing, the limit exists (allowing
+∞). Note that the monotone convergence theorem shows that this objective function satisﬁes
Koopmans’ equation:





∞,BZ∞) be the inﬁnite-dimensional self-product measurable space constructed from (Z,BZ) and let its
generic element be denoted by 1
￿ =( z1,z 2,...). If we construct the probability measure P
∞
0 (·|z0)o n( Z
∞,BZ∞)





















where 1x is a continuation of 0x after the realization of z1.
In order to describe the optimal investment strategy, we need some deﬁnitions. A func-
tion v∗ : R+ × Z → R is the value function for the fund-manager’s problem if it satisﬁes
(∀m,z) v∗(m,z) = max{ Iz(0x)| 0x is feasible from m} .
An investment strategy 0x is optimal from (m,z) ∈ R+ ×Z if it is feasible from m and satisﬁes




(x,m ) ∈ R2
+
    x + m  ≤ y + m and x ≤ m
 
.
When v∗ exists, we deﬁne the policy correspondence g : R+ × Z → R2
+ by





v∗(m ,z )P0(dz |z)
   
 
  (x,m ) ∈ Γ(m)
 
. (17)
For the policy correspondence to be well-deﬁned, v∗ must be such that (∀m ) v∗(m ,·)i sBZ-
measurable and the right-hand side of (17) is nonempty, which turns out to be the case for
the current model (see Theorem 1). An investment strategy 0x is recursively optimal from
(m,z) ∈ R+ × Z if there exists a money-holding strategy 1m such that7
(x0,m 1) ∈ g(m,z) and (∀t ≥ 1) (xt,m t+1) ∈ g(mt,z t).
Now, let us deﬁne the “trigger” level of z. (The reason this is called a trigger shall be
apparent later in Theorem 1.) Suppose that R : Z → R is a BZ-measurable function and deﬁne









Lemma 1 (Section 5) proves that there exists a solution R to the functional equation deﬁned by
R = TR (that is, a ﬁxed point of T) which satisﬁes (∀z)0≤ R(z) ≤ ¯ z. Lemma 1 also shows
that such a function R is unique and we denote it by R∗.
Given t ≥ 1, z ∈ Z and a BZ-measurable function h : Z → R, we denote by Et
0[h|z] the











7Note that among the requirements of recursive optimality is the existence of a measurable selection of g.13
Also, we deﬁne E0
0 by (∀h,z) E0
0[h|z]=h(z) and we often write E1
0 as E0. We then deﬁne a






Note that A is well-deﬁned and ﬁnite-valued since R∗ is a BZ-measurable bounded function
and β ∈ (0,1). Then, the following theorem characterizes the value function and the policy
correspondence for the fund-manager’s problem.
Theorem 1. The value function v∗ exists and is given by
(∀m,z) v∗(m,z)=
 
R∗(z)m + A(z) if z ≤ R∗(z)
zm+ A(z) if z>R ∗(z)
(20)





{(0,m+ y)} if z<R ∗(z)
{(x,m ) ∈ Γ(m)|x + m  = y + m} if z = R∗(z)
{(m,y)} if z>R ∗(z).
(21)
Furthermore, recursive optimality implies optimality.
We now construct an investment strategy 0x∗ (and its associated money-holding strategy
1m) which is recursively optimal from (m,z) as follows:
(∀t ≥ 0) (x∗
t,m t+1)=
 
(0,m t + y)i fzt ≤ R∗(zt)
(mt,y)i f zt >R ∗(zt)
(22)
where m0 ≡ m and z0 ≡ z. The stochastic process 0x∗ thus deﬁned is  BZt -adapted since
R∗ is BZ-measurable. Therefore, it is certainly an investment strategy and recursively optimal
from (m,z) by (21) and the deﬁnition of recursive optimality. By the last statement of Theorem
1, we know that 0x∗ is an optimal investment strategy from (m,z). We deﬁne a function
g∗ : R+ × Z → R+ by (∀mt,z t) x∗
t = g∗(mt,z t), where 0x∗ =  x∗
t ∞
t=0 is constructed by (22).
The optimal investment strategy has a simple form described by (22). It is now clear
why R∗ is called a trigger. When the realized value of z is greater than R∗(z), the fund-manager
invests all cash available into current investment. On the contrary, if the value of z is no greater
than R∗(z), he does not invest and carries over the whole cash to the next period.14
The existence of cash reserve provides the fund-manager with an option not to invest in
the current period but to wait until next period. This shows that the fund-manager has a call
option when he has cash in hand. Here, cash is an “enabler” of this call option, or ﬂexibility in
terms of Jones and Ostroy (1984). Cash is endowed with this function by the liquidity services
it provides, and ultimately by transaction costs implicit in the irreversibility of investment. This
observation will be further illustrated in the two special cases and in the case where the liquidity
constraint is absent.
3.2.1. Stochastically Increasing and Stochastically Convex Kernels
In general, the trigger level R∗ is a function, and hence, the shape of the “continuation
region,” {z ∈ Z |z ≤ R∗(z)}, depends on the shape of R∗. Depending on R∗, the shape of the
continuation region may be complicated. It may not be even a connected set. However, when
the Markov process under consideration meets some requirements, the continuation region is
largely simpliﬁed.
Speciﬁcally, assume that the kernel P0 is stochastically increasing and stochastically
convex (Section 3.1). In such a case, the optimal investment strategy, as well as the continuation
region, can be characterized in a simple manner. The optimal investment strategy 0x∗ has a
reservation property if there exists a constant z∗ ≥ 0 such that
(∀t ≥ 0) (x∗
t,m t+1)=
 
(0,m t + y)i fzt ≤ z∗
(mt,y)i f zt >z ∗ .
Here, the constant z∗, which we call a reservation value, serves as a trigger for the investment:
if the value of zt is greater than z∗, the whole available cash is put into the current investment.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the kernel P0 is stochastically increasing and stochastically convex.
Then, the optimal investment strategy has a reservation property. Furthermore, if βE0[z |z] ≥ z,
then there exists a unique z∗ ∈ Z such that z∗ = R∗(z∗) and the reservation level equals z∗.
The theorem shows that when the stochastic kernel satisﬁes the given conditions, the
reservation value z∗ exists in [0, ¯ z]. If z∗ <z , then the fund-manager always invests and the15
continuation region is given by the empty set. If an additional assumption of βE0[z |z] ≥ z is
satisﬁed, such a case is ruled out and it holds that z∗ ≥ z, and hence, the continuation region is
given by [z,z∗].
3.2.2. I.i.d. Kernels
If the stochastic kernel is i.i.d., it is clearly stochastically increasing and stochastically
convex. Therefore, Theorem 2 shows that the trigger level R∗ is constant and that it equals the
reservation value z∗. In such an i.i.d. case, we can further characterize the constant trigger level
R∗ (or equivalently, the reservation value z∗) as a unique solution to some simple equation.
To be more precise, suppose that zt is i.i.d. according to P0 and that F0 is its associated
distribution function. The expectation of zt with respect to P0 (or F0) is denoted by E0[z]. In
this i.i.d. case, it turns out from (18) that the trigger level R∗ is a constant which satisﬁes both









By Lemma 1 (Section 5), such a constant exists and is unique.
There are two possible cases. First, assume that βE0[z] <z . Then, it is easy to see that
R = βE0[z] solves (23). Therefore, by Lemma 1 (Section 5) and the fact that 0 ≤ βE0[z] ≤ ¯ z,
R∗ = βE0[z]. In this case, it always holds that (∀t) zt >R ∗, and hence, (22) implies that the
fund-manager always invests all the money available to him regardless of the realization of zt.
Note that this case happens when the fund-manager discounts the future a lot (that is, when
the interest rate is quite high) and/or when the distribution of zt is largely skewed toward its
lower tail. Clearly, waiting is not a good strategy in such cases.
Second, assume that βE0[z] ≥ z. Then, any solution R to (23) satisﬁes that z ≤ R<¯ z.8









8This is shown as follows. First, suppose that R<z . Then, (23) and the assumption that βE0[z] ≥ z imply
that R = βE0[z] ≥ z, which is a contradiction. Therefore, it holds that z ≤ R. Second, suppose that R ≥ ¯ z. Then,
(23) implies that R = βR, which in turn implies that R = 0 since β<1. This contradicts that R ≥ ¯ z>z≥ 0,


























z  dF0(z )
= βRF0(R)+β
 
¯ zF0(¯ z) − RF0(R) −




= β¯ z − β




  ¯ z
R
(1 − F0(z ))dz  , (24)
where the ﬁfth equality holds by the integration-by-parts formula (see, for example, Folland,





  ¯ z
R
(1 − F0(z ))dz  . (25)
In a summary, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Suppose that the kernel P0 is i.i.d. and assume that βE0[z] ≥ z holds. Then, the













and an optimal investment strategy 0x∗ is given by
(∀t ≥ 0) (x∗
t,m t+1)=
 
(0,m t + y) if zt ≤ R∗
(mt,y) if zt >R ∗ ,
where a constant R∗ is a unique solution to the equation (25).
Theorem 3 derives (3) and (4) in Subsection 2.1 and it substantiates our discussion there.
Note that the condition (7) in the uniform-distribution example given in the same subsection
implies that βE0[z] ≥ z holds as assumed in Theorem 3.
3.2.3. Absence of Liquidity Constraint in Investment17
Consider the fund-manager’s investment problem which is the same as the one in Subsec-
tion 3.2.2 except that the liquidity constraint in investment (or, the cash-in-advance constraint
in investment), (15), is absent. That is, suppose that the fund-manager may invest any amount
of money as long as only the budget constraint (14) is satisﬁed. In such a case, an optimal
investment strategy is characterized by the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Suppose that the liquidity constraint in investment, (15), is absent. Also assume
that the kernel P0 is i.i.d. and that βE0[z] ≥ z holds. Then, the value function v∗ for the





R∗m + R∗y +
R∗y
1 − β





and an optimal investment strategy 0x∗ is given by
(∀t ≥ 0) (x∗
t,m t+1)=
 
(0,m t + y) if zt ≤ R∗
(mt + y,0) if zt >R ∗ ,
where a constant R∗ is a unique solution to the equation (25).
Theorem 4 shows that the liquidity constraint in investment, (15), is not essential to
derive the reservation property of the optimal investment strategy. Furthermore, the reservation
values R∗ in Theorems 3 and 4 are identical. This shows that while the presence of the liquidity
constraint aﬀects the value function and the optimal investment level, it does not aﬀect the
reservation value at all. These facts indicate that the irreversibility of investment is the key
feature that determines the basic structure of the model. The liquidity constraint in investment
endows money with the role of an enabler of an option to postpone such irreversible investment.
3.3. Long-run Time-average Cash-holdings
We now turn to the issue of liquidity, or cash, demand. Throughout this subsection, we
assume that P0 has a limiting probability measure π0. By this, zt may be regarded as being
i.i.d. according to π0 in the long-run.18
We deﬁne the long-run time-average cash-holdings by the expectation of the optimal
cash-holdings with respect to its limiting probability measure. In view of (13), we consider the








where χ is the indicator function.9 It turns out10 that such a µ exists, its support is given by
M ≡{iy |i =1 ,2,...} and it can be explicitly calculated as
µ({y})=1− π∗
0 and (∀i ≥ 2) µ({iy})=( 1− π∗
0)(π∗
0)i−1
as far as π∗
0 ∈ (0,1), where we abbreviate π0 ({z |z ≤ R∗(z)})t oπ∗
0.
Alternatively, we can derive µ more constructively as the limiting probability measure
of the stochastic kernel which governs the transition of the optimal cash-holdings as follows.
First, we derive the stochastic kernel Q over R+×Z when the fund-manager follows the optimal
strategy (22) by
(∀B ∈B
￿+)(∀E ∈B Z)(∀m,z) Q(B × E |m,z)=χ{g∗(m,z)∈B }(m,z)P0(E|z).
It turns out that Q thus deﬁned only over the measurable rectangles can be extended to the
unique stochastic kernel Q :( B
￿+ ⊗B Z) × (R+ × Z) → [0,1].11 Second, we deﬁne the long-run
stochastic kernel for the optimal money-holdings, QM : B
￿+ × R+ → [0,1], to be the “marginal









an equivalent and somewhat simpler expression of which is
(∀m  =0 ) QM({m }|m)=
 
π∗
0 if m  = m + y
1 − π∗
0 if m  = y.
9That is, χA :
￿+ × Z →{ 0,1} is a function deﬁned by
(∀m,z) χA(m,z)=
￿
1i f( m,z) ∈ A
0i f( m,z) / ∈ A.
10See Taub (1988).
11See, for example, Stokey and Lucas (1989, p.284), Theorem 9.13.19
Third, when π∗
0 ∈ (0,1), the limiting probability measure of QM (in the sense deﬁned in Sub-
section 3.1) uniquely exists and equals µ.12
Suppose that π∗













1 − π0 ({z |z ≤ R∗(z)})
. (26)
If the probability that the investment is the optimal strategy measured by the limiting probability
measure π0 is higher, then the long-run average cash-holdings is smaller, as we would expect.
When zt is i.i.d., π0 always exists and equals P0 and R∗ is a constant which is charac-
terized by (25). Therefore, the long-run average cash-holdings, m∗




1 − P0 ({z |z ≤ R∗ })
, (27)
which justiﬁes (5) in Subsection 2.1.
4. An Increase in Risk
4.1. Eﬀects on Trigger Level
This section investigates an increase in risk and its eﬀects on the model’s outcomes.
We ﬁrst consider the eﬀect on the trigger level caused by an increase in risk in the sense of a
mean-preserving spread (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). To be precise, let P0 and P1 be two
probability measures. We denote by E0 and E1 the expectations with respect to P0 and P1,
respectively and we denote by F0 and F1 the distribution functions associated with P0 and P1,
respectively. By deﬁnition, P1 is obtained from P0 by a mean-preserving spread if it holds that







We say that a stochastic kernel P1 is obtained from P0 by a mean-preserving spread if (∀z ∈
Z) P1(·|z) is obtained from P0(·|z) by a mean-preserving spread.
12See, for example, Hoel, Port and Stone (1987, p.73), Theorem 7. Also note that µ satisﬁes
(∀m







The following theorem states that the increase in risk in the sense of a mean-preserving
spread raises (or at least unchanges) the trigger level, R∗.
Theorem 5. Let P0 be a stochastic kernel which is stochastically increasing and stochastically
convex and let P1 be a stochastic kernel which is obtained from P0 by the mean-preserving spread.
Then, (∀z ∈ Z) R∗
1(z) ≥ R∗
0(z), where R∗
i is the trigger level corresponding to Pi for each i =0 ,1.
Note that both P0 and P1 are assumed to be weakly continuous, which is a maintained
assumption throughout the paper. Also note that while the assumption that P0 is stochatically
increasing and stochastically convex is essential (see the proof of Theorem 5 in Section 5), P1
need to be neither stochastically increasing nor stochastically convex.
This theorem shows that the mean-preserving spread in the distribution of return shocks
increases the “trigger return level” that induces the fund-manager to invest. Theorem 2 implies
that under the assumption of Theorem 5, there exists the reservation value z∗
0. Suppose that
zt ≤ z∗
0. Then, it follows that zt ≤ R∗
1(zt) because zt ≤ R∗
0(zt) ≤ R∗
1(zt) where the ﬁrst inequality
holds since zt ≤ z∗
0 if and only if zt ≤ R∗
0(zt) by Theorem 2 and the second inequality holds by
Theorem 5. This shows that if making investment is not an optimal strategy before the risk
increases, it cannot be so after the risk has increased. Therefore, an increase in risk tends to
increase cash balances to be carried over to the next period in order to exploit potentially more
favorable future opportunities. Money cash balances work as a provider of this option, which is
more favorable under more risk.
Let us assume that zt is i.i.d. according to P0 and let P1 be an i.i.d. stochastic kernel
which is obtained from P0 by a mean-preserving spread. Since any i.i.d. kernel is stochasti-




reservation levels corresponding to Pi for each i =1 ,2.
Alternatively, we may verify this fact directly without invoking Theorem 5 as follows.
We need to consider two cases separately. First, assume that βE0[z] <z . In this case, we have
R∗
0 = βE0[z] (see Subsection 3.2.2). By the deﬁnition of the mean-preserving spread, it holds
that E0[z]=E1[z] and hence that R∗
1 = R∗
0. Therefore, an increase in risk does not alter the
trigger level in this case. Second, assume that βE0[z] ≥ z. In this case, for each i =0 ,1, R∗
i is21





It is easy to see that for each i =0 ,1, Hi is continuous and nondecreasing. Furthermore, the slope
of Hi is less than unity everywhere.14 Therefore, Hi crosses the 45-degree line once from above
because Hi(z)=βEi[z] ≥ z by the assumption. The unique intersection of Hi and the 45-degree
line, which must be no less than z, is the trigger level R∗
i. Finally, note that (∀x) H1(x) ≥ H0(x)




The argument of the previous paragraph veriﬁes that the comparative-static analysis
made in Subsection 2.2 for the uniform-distribution example remains to be true also for any
speciﬁcation of the distribution. Furthermore, Theorem 5 extends this to a Markovian setting
under the stated assumption on the original distribution.












































where the ﬁrst equality holds by the fourth equality in (24), the third equality holds by a version of the integration-
by-parts formula (Folland, 1984, p.103, 34(b)) and the fourth equality holds by the fact that limz→z− Fi(z)=0 .



























≤ β (Fi(x2)x2 − Fi(x1)x1 − (Fi(x2) − Fi(x1))x1)/(x2 − x1)
= βFi(x2) < 1,
where we invoked the integration-by-parts formula (see (24)) to show the inequality.22
We now turn to a discussion of the eﬀect of an increase in risk on the average cash-
holdings. To do this, suppose that the stochastic kernel P0 has a limiting probability measure
so that the long-run time-average cash-holdings m∗
0 may be well-deﬁned. Theorem 5 in the
previous subsection proved that a mean-preserving spread in the distribution increases the trigger
level under the appropriate assumption. Furthermore, the comparative-static analysis made in
Subsection 2.2 for the uniform-distribution example showed that it increases the average cash-
holdings as well as the trigger level. Nevertheless, the eﬀect of a mean-preserving spread on the
average cash-holdings is not clear in general for the following reasons.
First, we do not know whether or not a stochastic kernel P1, which is obtained from
another stochastic kernel P0 by a mean-preserving spread, has a limiting probability measure
even if P0 is assumed to have one, say π0.I f P1 does not have it, the average cash-holdings
under P1 is not well-deﬁned. Second, even if a limiting probability measure of P1,s a yπ1, exists,
we do not know whether or not π1 can be obtained from π0 by a mean-preserving spread. Third
and most importantly, even if π1 is obtained from π0 by a mean-preserving spread, it might be
the case that the probability that the return exceeds the trigger level increases while the trigger
level also increases. Then, the average cash-holdings would decrease, rather than increase, in
response to the mean-preserving spread (see (26) above).
The third point made in the previous paragraph is essential while the others are not. In
fact, if we assume that P0 and P1 are i.i.d. and that P1 is obtained from P0 by a mean-preserving
spread, then the ﬁrst two points become vacuous because in such a case, it holds trivially that
π0 = P0, π1 = P1 and π1 is obtained from π0 by a mean-preserving spread, but third point still
remains.
To see this point more closely, let P0 and P1 be i.i.d. stochastic kernels such that P1
is obtained from P0 by a mean-preserving spread and let R0 and R1 be the reservation levels
corresponding to P0 and P1, respectively. Recall that Theorem 5 shows that R∗
1 ≥ R∗
0. In view
of (27), if it were the case that P1 ({z |z ≤ R∗
1 }) ≥ P0 ({z |z ≤ R∗
0 }), then we would conclude
that an increase in risk in the form of mean-preserving spread increases (or at least, unchanges)
the average cash-holdings. Unfortunately, it is not always the case as the following example
illustrates.23
Example 1. Let Z =[ 0 ,3], let β>2/3, let P0 be such that P0({1})=P0({2})=1 /2, and let
P1 be such that P1({0})=1 /4 and P1({2})=3 /4. It can be shown that R∗
0 =2 β/(2 − β) and
R∗
1 =6 β/(4−β).15 It holds that R∗
1 >R ∗
0 as we expect. (This holds true regardless of the value of
β as far as β ∈ (0,1).) However, R∗
0 ∈ (1,2) and R∗
1 < 2 when β>2/3, and hence, F0(R∗
0)=1 /2
and F1(R∗
1)=1 /4. We thus have P1 ({z |z ≤ R∗
1 })=1 /4 < 1/2=P0 ({z |z ≤ R∗
0 }).
As this example suggests, in order to determine the eﬀect of an increase in risk on the
average cash-holdings, we need a stronger concept of being riskier than the mean-preserving
spread. We say that P0 and P1 satisfy a single-crossing property (Sargent, 1987, p.64) if there
exists ˆ z ∈ Z such that F1(z) ≥ F0(z) when z<ˆ z and F1(z) ≤ F0(z) when z ≥ ˆ z. It can be
seen immediately that if E0[z]=E1[z] and P0 and P1 satisfy a single-crossing property, then P1
is obtained from P0 by a mean-preserving spread. Therefore, we may regard the single-crossing
property as a stronger concept of being riskier than the mean-preserving spread. The single-
crossing property, however, is not yet strong enough to guarantee that the average cash-holdings
increase since P0 and P1 in Example 1 have the same expectation and satisfy the single-crossing
property. To guarantee it, we need a further assumption on P0, which is provided in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that two i.i.d. stochastic kernels P0 and P1 have the same expectation
and satisfy the single-crossing property with ˆ z. Assume further that
βE0[z]+β
  ˆ z
z
F0(z)dz < ˆ z. (30)
Then, we have m∗
1 ≥ m∗
0, where m∗
i is the average cash-holdings under Pi for each i =1 ,2.
In Example 1, P0 and P1 have the same expectation which equals 3/2 and they also
satisfy the single-crossing property with ˆ z = 1. The left-hand side of (30) is (3/2)β, and
hence, (30) is violated when β>2/3 as assumed in Example 1. Now suppose that β<2/3
in Example 1. Then, (30) holds true and both R∗
0 and R∗
1 would be less than 1. Therefore,
F∗
1(R∗
1)=1 /4 > 0=F∗
0(R∗
0) as the proposition predicts.
15Conjecture that R
∗
0 ∈ (1,2). Then, it follows from (25) that R
∗
0 =2 β/(2 − β), which certainly satisﬁes the
conjecture when β>2/3. Since we know that (25) has a unique solution, we conclude that R
∗
0 =2 β/(2 − β). A
similar argument applies for R
∗
1.24
Note that the condition (30) is suﬃcient but not necessary. In the uniform-distribution
example given in Subsection 2.2, (30) is not always satisﬁed.16 Nevertheless, it always holds
there that m∗
1 ≥ m∗
0 at least for a small change in risk which satisﬁes a single-crossing property.
5. Lemmas and Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) Weak continuity. Scheﬀ´ e’s theorem (Billingsley, 1986, p.218,
Theorem 16.11) shows that  P0(·|zn) − P0(·|z0) →0a sn → +∞ since the density function of
P0(·|zn) exists and converges to that of P0(·|z0) except at 0 and 1/(2 − z0), where  · is the
total variation norm, which implies the weak continuity of P0. (b) Stochastic increase. Note
that
(∀z,z )1 − F0(z |z) = max
 
0,1 − (2 − z)z  
. (31)
Since 1 − F0(z |z) is nondecreasing in z for each z , the stochastic increase follows from Topkis
(1998, p.161, Lemma 3.9.1(b)). (c) Stochastic convexity. From (31), we see that 1 − F0(z |z)
is convex in z for each z . Hence, the stochastic convexity follows from Topkis (1998, p.161,
Lemma 3.9.1(d)). (d) Existence of a limiting probability measure. Note that Assumption 12.1
of Stokey and Lucas (1989, p.381) is now satisﬁed (say, let a =0 ,b =1 ,c =1 /4, ε =1 /4 and
N = 1). Also, note that their “monotonicity” is the equivalent of weak increase here and their
“Feller property” is the equivalent of weak continuity here. Therefore, by their Theorem 12.12
(Stokey and Lucas, 1989, p.381), P0 has a limiting probability measure. 
Lemma 1. There exists a unique ﬁxed point R∗ to the operator T deﬁned by (18) which satisﬁes
(∀z)0≤ R∗(z) ≤ ¯ z. Furthermore, R∗ is upper semi-continuous (u.s.c.) and given by R∗ =
limn→∞ Tn¯ z = limn→∞ Tn0.






z , ¯ z
 
P0(dz |z) ≤ β
 
Z
¯ zP 0(dz |z)=β¯ z ≤ ¯ z = R+(z).
16In the uniform-distribution example in Subsection 2.2, ˆ z =( a+b)/2 and the left-hand side of (30) is β((3/8)a+
(5/8)b), which is greater than ˆ z when β is close to 1.25
Since T is monotonic in the sense that (∀R,R ) R ≥ R  ⇒ TR ≥ TR ,  TnR+ ∞
n=1, where Tn
denotes the t-fold self-composition of T, is a nonincreasing sequence of functions. Hence, its










































where the fourth inequality holds by the monotone convergence theorem.








P0(dz |z) ≥ 0=R−(z).
Since (∀R,R ) R ≥ R  ⇒ TR ≥ TR ,  TnR+ ∞
n=1 is a nondecreasing sequence of functions.
Hence, its limit exists and BZ-measurable. We denote it by R∞. We now see that R∞ is a ﬁxed









































where the fourth inequality holds by the monotone convergence theorem.
This paragraph shows that R∞ = R∞. To this end, let z ∈ Z and let n ≥ 1. Then, we26
have








































Since the whole inequality holds for any n, taking the limit proves the claim.
Let R be any ﬁxed point of T such that R− =0≤ R ≤ ¯ z = R+. Then, it holds that
TR− ≤ TR= R ≤ TR+ by the monotonicity of T and the assumption that R is a ﬁxed point
of T. By iterating this procedure, we have (∀n) TnR− ≤ R ≤ TnR+. Therefore, it follows that
R∞ = limn→∞ TnR− ≤ R ≤ limn→∞ TnR+ = R∞. This and the fact proven in the previous
paragraph show that R = R∞ = R∞, and hence, R∗ ≡ R∞ is the unique ﬁxed point of T
satisfying 0 ≤ R∗ ≤ ¯ z.
Finally, we show that R∗ is u.s.c. The weak increase of P0 and Gihmann and Skorohod
(1979, Lemma 1.5) imply that (∀n) TnR+ is u.s.c. in z. Therefore, R∗ is u.s.c. since it is the
inﬁmum of u.s.c. functions by R∗ = limn→∞ TnR+ = infn≥1 TnR+ . 
Lemma 2. The function A deﬁned by (19) is u.s.c. and satisﬁes
(∀z) A(z)=R∗(z)y + βE0[A|z]=R∗(z)y + β
 
Z
A(z )P0(dz |z). (32)
Proof. (U.s.c.) Since R∗ is u.s.c. (Lemma 1) and bounded from above (by ¯ z), (∀s ≥ 0) Es
0[R∗|z]
is u.s.c. in z by Gihmann and Skorohod (1979, Lemma 1.5). Let z0 ∈ Z and let ε>0. Since
Es




0[R∗|z] <ε / 2. Furthermore, since
 S
s=0 βsEs
0[R∗|z] is u.s.c. in z (because




0[R∗|z] <A (z0)+ε/2. Finally, we have (∀z ∈ N) A(z) <A (z0)+ε, which
completes the proof.























   
 
   
z
 
= R∗(z)y + βE0[A|z],
where the third equality holds by the law of iterated expectations and the fourth equality holds
by the monotone convergence theorem. 
Proof of Theorem 1. First, we show that the function ˆ v : R+ × Z → R deﬁned by





is the solution to Bellman’s equation:





v(m ,z )P0(dz |z)
 
   









ˆ v(m ,z )P0(dz |z)
   
 















   




xz + m TR∗(z)+βE0[A|z]
 




xz + m R∗(z)+βE0[A|z]
 




R∗(z)(m + y)+βE0[A|z]i fz ≤ R∗(z)
mz + R∗(z)y + βE0[A|z]i f z>R ∗(z)28
=
 
R∗(z)m + R∗(z)y + βE0[A|z]i fz ≤ R∗(z)
zm+ R∗(z)y + βE0[A|z]i f z>R ∗(z)
=
 
R∗(z)m + A(z)i fz ≤ R∗(z)
zm+ A(z)i f z>R ∗(z)
=ˆ v(m,z),
where the third equality holds by the fact that R∗ is the ﬁxed point of T and sixth equality
holds by Equation (32).
Second, we show that ˆ v is admissible (the Appendix), that is, ˆ v is u.s.c. and satisﬁes





(1 − β)2 .
That ˆ v is u.s.c. follows since R∗ is u.s.c. (by Lemma 1) and A is u.s.c. (by Lemma 2). To show
the inequalities, note that R∗ ≤ TR+ ≤ β¯ z by (18). Therefore,





















(1 − β)2 .
Finally, since ˆ v is an admissible solution to Bellman’s equation as shown in the preceding
paragraphs, we conclude that v∗ deﬁned by (20), which equals ˆ v, is the value function by Theorem
A1. Furthermore, the ﬁrst paragraph of this proof shows that g deﬁned by (21) is the policy
correspondence. Finally, that recursive optimality implies optimality is among the conclusions
of Theorem A1. 
Lemma 3. Suppose that the kernel P0 is stochastically increasing and stochastically convex.
Then, R∗ is nondecreasing and convex in z.
Proof. First, we show that for each n ≥ 1, TnR+ is nondecreasing and convex in z. We prove
this by induction. The statement holds true when n = 0 since T0R+ = R+ =¯ v is constant
and hence both nondecreasing and convex in z. Suppose that Tn−1R+ is nondecreasing and29
convex in z. Then, max{z ,Tn−1R+(z )} is also nondecreasing and convex in z . Therefore,
TnR+ is nondecreasing and convex by Topkis (1998, p.161, Corollary 3.9.1(a)(c)) since P0 is
stochastically increasing and stochastically convex.
Since R∗ is a pointwise limit of a sequence of nondecreasaing and convex functions by
Lemma 1 and the fact proven in the previous paragraph, R∗ is nondecreasing and convex. 
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 3, R∗ is convex and hence continuous on (z, ¯ z). Since
R∗ is u.s.c. by Lemma 1 and nondecreasing by Lemma 3, it is continuous on [z, ¯ z) with only
possible discontinuity occurring at z =¯ z. Furthermore, note that R∗(¯ z) ≤ TR+ = β¯ z<¯ z.
Therefore, Lemma 3 implies that the graph of R∗ crosses the 45-degree line from above if and
only if R∗(z) ≥ z. First, suppose that R∗(z) <z . Then, any z∗ such that 0 ≤ z∗ <zserves as
a reservation level and the optimal strategy clearly has a reservation property. Second, suppose
that R∗(z) ≥ z. Then, there exists a unique z∗ ∈ Z such that z∗ = R∗(z∗) and the optimal
strategy has a reservation property since {z ∈ Z |z ≤ R∗(z)} = {z ∈ Z |z ≤ z∗ }.
We complete the proof by showing that when βE0[z |z] ≥ z, it holds that R∗(z) ≥ z.T o
see this, suppose that it does not. Then, since R∗ solves R∗ = TR∗, it follows from (18) that
R∗(z)=βE0[z |z] ≥ z >R ∗(z), which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 3. This follows immediately from Theorem 1 since A(z)=R∗y/(1 − β)
by (19). 




(x,m ) ∈ R2
+
 
  x + m  ≤ y + m
 
and let R∗ be a unique solution to (25). First, we show that the function ˆ v : R+ × Z → R
deﬁned by






is the solution to Bellman’s equation:





v(m ,z )P0(dz )
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xz +( m  + y)R∗ +
βR∗y
1 − β
   






R∗(y + m + y)+
βR∗y
1 − β
if z ≤ R∗

















where the second equality holds by the fact that R∗ is a solution to (23).
Second, we observe that all the results (in particular, Theorem A1) in the Appendix still






(1 − β)2 .
To do this, we only need to verify that Bˆ v+ ≤ ˆ v+ (Lemma A2), which holds true because
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    (x,m ) ∈ ˆ Γ(m)
 
≤ (m + y)z +





≤ (m + y)¯ z +










(1 − β)2 =ˆ v+(m,z).31
Third, we show that ˆ v is admissible (the Appendix), that is, ˆ v is u.s.c. and satisﬁes
ˆ v ≤ ˆ v+. The former is immediate and the latter holds because


















(1 − β)2 =ˆ v+(m,z),
where the ﬁrst inequality holds since R∗ ≤ β¯ z by (23).
Finally, note that ˆ v is an admissible solution to Bellman’s equation as proven in the ﬁrst
and third paragraphs of this proof. Therefore, Theorem A1 (the Appendix) completes the proof.

Proof of Theorem 5. For each i =0 ,1, let Ti be the operator deﬁned from Pi by (18).
We show that for each n ≥ 1, Tn
1 R+ ≥ Tn
0 R+, which completes the proof since (∀i) R∗
i =
limn→∞ Tn
i R+. We prove the claim by induction. The statement clearly holds true when n =0
since T0
1R+ = R+ = T0
0R+. Suppose that Tn−1
1 R+ ≥ Tn−1
0 R+. Then,
Tn
1 R+ = T1 ◦ Tn−1
1 R+
























where the ﬁrst inequality holds by the induction hypothesis. To see that the second inequality





is convex in z  by Lemma 3 and the fact that the maxi-
mum of two convex functions is convex. Therefore, the inequality holds true by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970) since P1(·|z) is obtained from P0(·|z) by the mean-preserving spread for each z.
32
Proof of Proposition 2. Note that the left-hand side of (30) can be written as H0(ˆ z), where a
function H0 : Z → R is deﬁned by (29). We showed there that H0 crosses the 45-degree line once
from above at z = R∗
0. Therefore, (30) implies that R∗
0 < ˆ z, and hence, that F1(R∗
0) ≥ F0(R∗
0)b y
the single-crossing property. Since R∗
1 ≥ R∗
0 by Theorem 5, we have F1(R∗
1) ≥ F0(R∗
0). Finally,
(27) completes the proof. 
APPENDIX
This appendix provides a method of dynamic programming which can be applied to the
model in the current paper. The proofs given in Section 5 rely on the results in this appendix.
We start with some deﬁnitions. Deﬁne the function v+ : R+ → R+ by
(∀m) v+(m) = lim
T→+∞













(1 − β)2 ≡ B+m + A+ .
The function v+ may be called the overly-optimistic value function since for any investment
strategy 0x which is feasible from m, it holds that (∀z) Iz(0x) ≤ v+(m). A function v : R+×Z →
R is admissible if it is upper semi-continuous (u.s.c.) and satisﬁes (∀m,z)0≤ v(m,z) ≤ v+(m).
Obviously, v+ is admissible. Deﬁne the Bellman operator, which maps an admissible function v
to another function Bv,b y





v(m ,z )P0(dz |z)
   
    (x,m ) ∈ Γ(m)
 
, (34)
whose well-deﬁnition is proved below. We denote by Bn the n-fold self-composition of B,
B ◦···◦B. Finally an admissible function v solves Bellman’s equation if v = Bv.
Lemma A1. The Bellman operator is well-deﬁned.
Proof. First, we show that for any admissible function v, the mapping deﬁned by
(m ,z)  →
 
Z
v(m ,z )P0(dz |z)33
is u.s.c. To do this, let v be an admissible function and let  (m 
n,z n) ∞
n=1 be a sequence in R+×Z
which converges to (m 
0,z 0). Then, by the admissibility of v and the u.s.c. of v+, there exists
N ≥ 1 such that
(∀n ≥ N)(∀z ∈ Z) v(m 
n,z n) ≤ v+(m 
n) <v +(m 
0)+1.












which proves the claim.
Second, we completes the proof by showing that for any admissible function v, Bv is
well-deﬁned. However, this follows immediately because the maximand in (34) is u.s.c. by the
fact proven in the previous paragraph and because Γ is compact-valued. 
Lemma A2. Bv+ ≤ v+ and for any admissible function v, Bv is admissible.
Proof. The ﬁrst half of the lemma follows because
(∀m,z) Bv+(m,z) = max
 
xz + βB+m  + βA+  
  (x,m ) ∈ Γ(m)
 
≤ mz + βB+(m + y)+βA+






(1 − β)2 = v+(m,z).
To show the latter half of the lemma, let v be an admissible function. Then, the admis-
sibility of v, the fact that B is monotonically non-decreasing in v and the inequality proven in
the previous paragraph show that 0 ≤ B0 ≤ Bv ≤ Bv+ ≤ v+. Furthermore, Bv is u.s.c. by
the maximum theorem (Berge, 1963) because the maximand in (34) is u.s.c. by Lemma A1 and
because Γ is continuous. 
Lemma A3. For any m ≥ 0, any investment strategy 0x which is feasible from m and any
admissible function v, it holds that34
















Proof. Let (m,z) ∈ R+×Z, let 0x be an investment strategy which is feasible from m and let
v be an admissible function. The iterated applications of Koopmans’ equation to 0x shows that














where Tx is a continuation of 0x after the realization of 1zT. Therefore, for any T ≥ 1, it follows
that
 



















   
= β
   
































   
























































= βT(B+Ty+ B+m + A+),
where the ﬁfth inequality holds since (∀zT) IzT(Tx) ≤ v+(Ty+ m) by the fact that for any
investment strategy 0x which is feasible from m, xT ≤ Ty+m. Since the last term of the above
inequalities goes to 0 as T → +∞, we have
lim
T→∞
   

















   
  =0,
which completes the proof. 
Lemma A4. Any admissible solution to Bellman’s equation is the value function.
Proof. Let v be an admissible function which solves Bellman’s equation and let (m,z) ∈
R+ ×Z. This paragraph shows that for any investment strategy 0x which is feasible from m,i t
holds that v(m,z) ≥ Iz(0x). Let 0x be such an investment strategy and let 1m be its associated
money-holding strategy. Then,

























where the ﬁrst inequality holds since v solves Bellman’s equation and (x0,m 1) ∈ Γ(m) by the
feasibility, the second inequality holds since v solves Bellman’s equation and (x1,m 2) ∈ Γ(m1)
by the feasibility, and so on. Since the whole inequality holds for any T ≥ 1, Lemma A3 proves
the claim.
This paragraph completes the proof by showing that there exists an investment strategy
0x which is feasible from m and satisﬁes v(m,z)=Iz(0x). Deﬁne the investment strategy 0x
and the money-holding strategy 1m recursively by





v(m ,z )P0(dz |z)
 
   
  (x,m ) ∈ Γ(m)
 
and





v(m ,z )P0(dz |zt)
 
 
    (x,m ) ∈ Γ(mt)
 
.



























where the equalities hold by the deﬁnition of 0x and 1m and because v solves Bellman’s equation.
Since the whole inequality holds for any T ≥ 1, Lemma A3 proves the claim. 
Lemma A5. A function v∞ deﬁned by v∞ ≡ limn→∞ Bnv+ is an admissible solution to Bell-
man’s equation.
Proof. Since by Lemma A2 and the fact that B is non-decreasing in v,  Bnv+ ∞
n=1 is a non-
increasing sequence of u.s.c. functions which are bounded from below by 0, its limit exists and
is u.s.c. Therefore, v∞ is a well-deﬁned admissible function. In the rest of this proof, we show
that v∞ solves Bellman’s equation.
Note that (∀n ≥ 1) Bn+1v+ = B ◦ Bnv+ ≥ B ◦ limn→∞ Bnv+ = Bv∞. Therefore, we
have v∞ = limn→∞ Bn+1v+ ≥ Bv∞.
To show the opposite inequality, let (m,z) ∈ R+×Z and let  (xn,m  
n) ∞
n=1 be a sequence
in R2
+ such that






Bnv+(m ,z )P0(dz |z)
   
    (x,m ) ∈ Γ(m)
 
.
Such a sequence exists since the right-hand side is nonempty by Lemma A1 and the admissibility
of Bnv+. Since Γ(m) is compact, there exists a subsequence  (xn(i),m  
n(i)) ∞
i=1 which converges
to (x0,m  






v∞(m ,z )P0(dz |z)
 
   
  (x,m ) ∈ Γ(m)
 

































































where the second inequality holds by the u.s.c. of Bn(i)v+. To show the fourth inequality, let
J ≥ 1 be such that (∀j ≥ J) m 
n(j) <m  
0 + 1. Then, it follows that
(∀j ≥ J)(∀z  ∈ Z) Bn(j)v+(m 
n(j),z ) ≤ v+(m 
n(j),z )=B+m 
n(j) + A+ <B +(m 
0 +1 )+A+ .
Therefore, the desired inequality holds by Fatou’s lemma. 
Theorem A1. The value function exists, it is the unique admissible solution to Bellman’s equa-
tion, and recursive optimality implies optimality.
Proof. Lemmas A4 and A5 show that v∞ is a value function, and hence, the value function
certainly exists. Suppose that v and v  are two admissible solutions to Bellman’s equation.
Then, it must be that v = v  because both v and v  must be the value function by Lemma A4
and because the value function is unique by its deﬁnition. Therefore, the admissible solution to
Bellman’s equation is unique and equals v∞ since v∞ is admissible by Lemma A5. Finally, the
second paragraph of the proof of Lemma A4 shows that recursive optimality implies optimality.

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